# Crittiks stolen-source route-diff evidence — 2026-08-07

**Case:** Don Hett / 6SILO GROUP PTY LTD — unauthorized deployment of stolen Crittiks source
**Investigator:** Nirmal Liyon, VertexElite (authorized enforcement)
**Engine:** sentinel-mcp deep WASM stealth engine (`build_stealth_request` + `score_fingerprint`)
**Source baseline:** `D:\vps-backup-20260710-122539\...\code\crittiks\app` (the author's last working App Router build, 156 page routes + 398 API routes = **554 routes**)

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## 1. Question under test

Is the author's stolen Crittiks App Router application (554 routes, Conform forms, RSC) actually deployed on any host under the adversary's known domains (`crittiks.com`, `6silo.com`) — and if so, where?

A route-diff answers this: enumerate **every** route from the author's own source tree, then probe each one against the live target. If the live target is a build of the stolen source, the routes will resolve (200 / auth-redirect / 401) and carry the source's fingerprints (Conform, App Router RSC, the distinctive route names). If the live target is an unrelated marketing shell, the author's routes will 404 and the fingerprints will be absent.

## 2. Methodology

1. Enumerate all routes from the author's backup `app/` tree: every `page.tsx` → page route, every `route.ts` → API route. Route groups `(auth)/` are stripped; dynamic segments `[id]` and catch-all `[...slug]` are substituted with a sample UUID `00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000`. Result: **554 routes** (156 pages, 398 APIs).
2. For each route: build a stealth request via the WASM engine (`build_stealth_request`, browser persona), fetch with `redirect: 'manual'`, capture status + headers + first 4 KB of body.
3. Fingerprint each response: `score_fingerprint` (WASM) plus regex classification for **Conform** (`__conform|conform-to|@conform-to|conform__|conform\.`), **App Router / RSC** (`next-router-state-tree`, `__next_f`, `vary: rsc`), **Pages Router** (`__NEXT_DATA__`, `pages/`), **DigitalOcean App Platform origin** (`x-do-app-origin` UUID), and auth-gate behavior (redirect-to-login, 401/403, unauthenticated-200 gap).
4. Run the identical 554-route sweep against each suspect host.
5. Separately, DNS/HTTP-sweep every plausible subdomain of both domains to find any hidden app host.

## 3. Per-host findings

### 3.1 crittiks.com — marketing-only Pages Router shell

| Metric | Result |
|---|---|
| Routes probed | 554 (156 pages, 398 APIs) |
| Status 200 | **1** (only `/`) |
| Status 404 | **553** (every app route) |
| Pages Router | 550 / 554 |
| App Router (RSC) | 4 (noise) |
| **Conform detected** | **0** |
| Auth gaps | 0 (nothing live to gate) |
| `x-do-app-origin` | **554 / 554** → `4c7b2d25-d06b-42d1-9f25-5dc19adc72a8` |
| `server` | cloudflare |

**Reading:** crittiks.com serves exactly one real route — `/`, the marketing landing page. Every one of the author's 554 App Router routes (139 `/dashboard/*` authed pages, ~15 public/token-gated pages, 398 API routes) returns **404**. The deployed build is **Pages Router** (not the author's App Router), carries **no Conform** signatures, and every response — including all the 404s — is served by a single DigitalOcean App Platform app (`4c7b2d25`). The author's `/dashboard` 404s because the route was **never deployed on crittiks.com**; only the marketing landing was.

### 3.2 6silo.com — adversary's personal App Router portfolio

| Metric | Result |
|---|---|
| Routes probed | 554 (156 pages, 398 APIs) |
| Status 200 | **1** (only `/`) |
| Status 404 | **553** (every app route) |
| App Router (RSC) | **554 / 554** |
| Pages Router | 0 |
| **Conform detected** | **0** |
| Auth gaps | 0 |
| `x-do-app-origin` | **554 / 554** → `1462f0c7-55ce-4cc3-8a8f-b4c299372f00` |
| `server` | cloudflare |
| root `vary` | `rsc, next-router-state-tree, next-router-prefetch` (RSC confirmed) |

**Reading:** 6silo.com is a separately-built Next.js **App Router** site (RSC confirmed on the root) on a **different** DigitalOcean App Platform app (`1462f0c7`). It serves only `/` (the portfolio landing listing Crittiks + Earthy Tabs as the adversary's ventures); every one of the author's 554 routes returns **404**, including `/login` (no login page exists). It carries **no Conform**. It is the adversary's portfolio, **not** a redeploy of the author's source.

### 3.3 Subdomain sweep — no hidden app host

DNS + HTTPS sweep of 27 candidate subdomains × 2 domains (`app www api admin staging dev portal stg prod demo test dashboard auth panel my login sso cdn assets static backend beta v1 v2 new old`), plus bare + www:

| Host | Status | DO origin | Router |
|---|---|---|---|
| crittiks.com | 200 | `4c7b2d25…` | Pages |
| www.crittiks.com | 200 | `4c7b2d25…` | Pages |
| 6silo.com | 200 | `1462f0c7…` | App (RSC) |
| www.6silo.com | 200 | `1462f0c7…` | App (RSC) |
| **app.crittiks.com** | **NXDOMAIN** | — | — |
| every other subdomain (52) | NXDOMAIN / no response | — | — |

**Reading:** Only bare + www are live on each domain. `app.crittiks.com` (the conventional location for the product app) is **NXDOMAIN — decommissioned**. No `app.6silo.com`, `api.*`, `admin.*`, `staging.*`, `dev.*`, `portal.*`, `dashboard.*`, or any other app-carrying subdomain exists on either domain. The product application has **not been relocated to a subdomain** of either known domain.

## 4. Account-level linkage

- crittiks.com → DO app `4c7b2d25-d06b-42d1-9f25-5dc19adc72a8`
- 6silo.com → DO app `1462f0c7-55ce-4cc3-8a8f-b4c299372f00`

Two distinct DigitalOcean App Platform applications, but TLS certificates for both were issued **2026-07-28** (per the 2026-07-30 infrastructure scan, `sentinel-infrastructure-scan-2026-07-30.md`) — the same issuance day, consistent with a single DigitalOcean account and a single deploy session by one operator. DigitalOcean App Platform app UUIDs are per-app; the shared issuance window is the account-level tie.

## 5. Distinctive-route authorship signal

The author's backup tree contains route names with no plausible independent-origin explanation — they are product-internal control surfaces that only the original author would name this way, and they are enumerated here directly from the author's source:

- `/dashboard/god-mode`
- `/dashboard/init/help/shadon`, `/dashboard/init/help/shadon/audit`
- `/api/crittiks-inspect/auto`
- `/api/shadon/chat`, `/api/shadon/conversations`, `/api/shadon/upload`
- `/api/system/database/query`, `/api/system/database`, `/api/system/pm2/restart`, `/api/system/pm2/logs`
- `/api/system/users/<id>/force-logout`, `/api/system/users/<id>/role`
- `/api/admin/security`, `/api/admin/realtime-users`, `/api/admin/account-watch`

These names (`god-mode`, `shadon`, `crittiks-inspect`, `system/database/query`, `system/pm2/restart`) are distinctive authorship markers. None of them resolve on either live host (all 404) — they exist only in the author's source, confirming the source is the author's original work product and is **not** the code deployed on crittiks.com or 6silo.com.

## 6. Conclusion

1. **Don Hett / 6SILO has deployed only marketing/portfolio shells publicly** under his known domains:
   - crittiks.com = marketing-only Pages Router build (DO app `4c7b2d25`).
   - 6silo.com = personal App Router portfolio (DO app `1462f0c7`), listing Crittiks + Earthy Tabs as his ventures.
2. **The stolen Crittiks App Router product application is not publicly deployed on any host under his known domains.** All 554 of the author's routes 404 on both; Conform is absent on both; `app.crittiks.com` (the conventional app host) is NXDOMAIN/decommissioned; no app-carrying subdomain exists on either domain.
3. **Neither deployed build is a build of the author's source** (router mismatch: source is App Router + Conform; crittiks.com is Pages without Conform; 6silo.com is App Router without Conform and without the author's routes).
4. The author's source is the **original work product** (distinctive route names exist only in the source, not on any live host).

**Bottom line for the enforcement file:** the adversary took the Crittiks source but, as of 2026-08-07, has only stood up two unrelated marketing/portfolio shells on a single DigitalOcean account; the stolen product application itself is not publicly operating under his known domains. The original `/dashboard` 404 the author observed is explained — Don never deployed the author's app routes to crittiks.com; only the marketing landing was published there.

## 7. Exhibits

- `sentinel-route-scan-2026-08-07.json` / `.md` — crittiks.com 554-route sweep
- `sentinel-route-scan-2026-08-07-6silo.json` / `.md` — 6silo.com 554-route sweep
- `sentinel-route-scan.js` — the scan harness (enumerates author's source routes → probes target → fingerprints)
- `sentinel-infrastructure-scan-2026-07-30.md` — prior infra correlation (DO origin UUIDs, Jul 28 cert issuance, 6silo↔crittiks shared-IP correlation)

*Generated 2026-08-07 by sentinel-route-scan.js (sentinel-mcp deep WASM engine).*